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I. FRAMING THE DEBATE
What does it mean for something to be physically continuous? Does it mean the object
can’t be broken down into individual parts or does it simply mean the individual parts
are intrinsically linked? And what about reality itself, particularly as it is manifest in the
physical universe within which we abide? These are heady questions that have long trou-
bled physicists, mathematicians, philosophers, and even theologians. As the great French
physicist Louis de Broglie noted,
[t]he conflict between the continuous view in Physics, and its opposite, has ex-
isted through many centuries with varying fortunes, each gaining an advantage
over the other in turn, and neither winning a definite victory. For the philoso-
pher there is nothing surprising in this, since the development of theory in every
sphere of intellectual activity shows him that, if pushed to an extreme and op-
posed to each other, the concepts of both the continuous and the discontinuous
are unable to give a correct rendering of Reality, which requires a subtle and
almost indefinable fusion of the two terms of this antimony. [1], p. 217
What is perhaps most intriguing about de Broglie’s statement is the last line in which he
suggests that a proper rendering of physical reality requires some ‘indefinable fusion’ of the
continuous and the discrete. There are two points to be considered here. The first is the
most obvious: whether or not reality really requires both continuous and discrete views as
opposed to one in lieu of the other. The second is more subtle: are we speaking of physical
reality here or merely our rendering (knowledge) of it? It seems to me that these are two
distinct questions to be considered for it is entirely conceivable that the continuity of our
knowledge about reality might be wholly distinct from the continuity of reality itself.
The distinction between states of reality and states of knowledge is described quite suc-
cinctly by Spekkens in [2] where he applies the terms ontic and epistemic to refer to states
of reality and knowledge respectively. In order to fully understand the distinction between
these two types of states, let us look at simple, classical (and uncontroversial) examples of
both. The state of a clock, for instance, at a specific time at which we can specify the exact
alignment of all the gears, hands, and dials, is considered an ontic state. Conversely, the
state of a molecule in a volume of gas, as specified, say, by its translational kinetic energy, is
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2an epistemic state since it can only be predicted probabilistically using standard statistical
mechanics. As Spekkens points out, the distinction between these two types of state breaks
down for states of complete knowledge. So, for instance, if we could ‘freeze’ our hypothetical
gas at an instant in time and hone in on this one molecule, classical physics assumes that
we could specify its exact state (since it allows for the specification of instantaneous values
for quantities such as velocity - I will have more to say on this a bit later).
Spekkens’ epistemic interpretation of quantum mechanics thus deals specifically with
states of incomplete knowledge. But what about those states of complete knowledge? Are
they anything more than a pipe dream? Can we ever really know something fully? As it
turns out, these questions are intimately related to the debate between the continuous and
discrete views. Thus we can frame the continuity debate in terms of ontic and epistemic
states. Arguably we are most interested in exploring the continuity of the ontic states
since the real point of all this is to understand reality. But what if the only way to get
information about ontic states is through epistemic states? Further, what if the epistemic
states themselves are discrete? How could we even determine if the underlying ontic states
were continuous or not if the ‘lens’ through which we view them is discrete? These questions,
however, deal with individual states rather than reality as a whole. The process becomes
considerably more murky when we ask questions about reality itself. Is it even possible to
reach conclusions about a reality that we are within and thus an integral part of?
We may never find answers to some of these questions, but we can still learn a great deal
about the universe and our ability to analyze it by considering them. In doing so, however,
we will find that the comfortable bosom of classical physics is nothing more than a mirage
built on hundreds of years of human instinct and nature. In the process we have so tightly
woven mathematics and physics together that it sometimes becomes difficult to extricate one
from the other. Forgotten in this process is the fact that it is not at all clear just how closely
mathematics comes to physical reality nor if it can serve as the sole conduit for interpreting
that reality [3]. Rightly or wrongly, we nevertheless often assume that most mathematics
is representative of reality. If the mathematics works, has experimental support, and, in
the best of circumstances, predicts new phenomena, then it seems justifiable to take this
view. But what if two such mathematical models find an interpretive contradiction? Are
we prepared to give up the more cherished interpretation?
II. A PARADOX, A PARADOX, A MOST INGENIOUS PARADOX1
Classical, Newtonian physics was the only physics for nearly three-hundred years. It
would not have developed in the manner and at the rate it did were it not for the development
of ‘infinitesimal calculus’ by Newton and Leibniz in the 1660s. Though it has undergone a
plethora of changes over the years, calculus remains an important tool in numerous fields. Its
development was not free from debate, however. As its name suggests, one of its cornerstones
was the notion of ‘infinitesimal change.’ In 1734 George Berkeley attacked the entire notion
of these infinitesimal changes (termed ‘fluxions’ by Newton). He asked,
[a]nd what are these Fluxions? The Velocities of evanescent Increments? And
what are these same evanescent Increments? They are neither finite Quantities
1Apologies to Gilbert and Sullivan.
3nor Quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing. May we not call them the Ghosts
of departed Quantities? [4], section XXXV.
The ghosts to which Berkeley was referring can be understood through a simple example.
Suppose we have a simple parabolic function, y = x2. What happens to this function if we
want to change it just a bit, say by an amount ∆y? This should mean that x changes by
some small amount as well, call it ∆x. The function should now look like this:
y +∆y = (x+∆x)2.
What’s the actual nature of the small change, ∆y, that we have just introduced? Noting
that our original function sets y = x2, let’s subtract it out from each side and simplify. This
gives us
∆y = (x+∆x)2 − x2 = 2x∆x+ (∆x)2.
But how does introducing a small change in x (essentially perturbing the system) affect y?
Taking the ratio of the changes gives
∆y
∆x
= 2x+∆x.
This of course is not the same thing as the derivative of y which is known to be 2x. In order
to get this familiar result it is necessary to simply assume that ∆x is infinitesimally small
and thus essentially zero [5]. But if it is essentially zero, what does that mean for the ratio
on the left? Either it is infinite (or undefined) or we need some more clever way out. The
clever way out didn’t exist in 1734 and so Berkeley viewed this as a paradox: somehow the
infinitesimal ∆x simply “departed” leaving its “ghost” behind in the denominator on the
left.
There are numerous ‘resolutions’ to Berkeley’s paradox. The foundations of infinitesimal
calculus were put on a sound footing by Cauchy and Weierstrass in the early nineteenth
century through the introduction of limits and a definition of continuity in terms of in-
finitesimals [6]. Abraham Robinson later claimed to “vindicate” Leibniz (and presumably
Newton) in his 1966 book Non-standard analysis [7]. However, nearly every argument that
purportedly gives infinitesimals a solid foundation shares the fact that they are all purely
mathematical. If we are solely interested in the validity of the mathematical argument then
this is as it should be. But what happens when we start applying infinitesimals to physical
properties?
III. EVERY GOOD MYTH NEEDS AN ANCIENT GREEK
Actually, it is the converse question - how do we explain certain apparent physical para-
doxes in a logical manner? - that helped lead to the development of infinitesimals to begin
with. The paradoxes to which we refer are those famously attributed to Zeno of Elea, no-
tably those of Achilles and the tortoise, dichotomy, and an arrow in flight. As Boyer writes,
“[i]f the paradoxes are thus stated in the precise mathematical terminology of continuous
variables . . . the seeming contradictions resolve themselves” [8], p. 295. The importance of
Zeno’s arguments, however, lie not merely in the fact that they are seemingly easily refuted.
As philosopher John Mansley Robinson observes,
4The art of Socrates is the art of Zeno put to a different purpose. To the end it
gave shape and form to the philosophy of Plato; and through Plato it entered into
the very structure of European philosophy. For it was Plato’s pupil Aristotle who
gave to logic the form which it was to bear for the next two thousand years; and
to an extent which we are only beginning to realize this logic was a rationalization
of the techniques of debate. It was for this reason that the founders of modern
science, when they rebelled against the logic of Aristotle, did so on the ground
that it was concerned not with discovery but with proof. Through Aristotle the
spirit of Zeno passed into the thought of the late middle ages. [9], p. 139.
For the record, I am no Aristotelian. Nevertheless, it is in the sense described by Robinson
that we can trace through Aristotle directly to Zeno one of the major problems that has
crept into modern physics: an over-reliance on the use of mathematics as a means for
interpreting physical processes. This problem is no more apparent than in the application
of infinitesimals to the study of motion (which is precisely what Boyer was speaking of in
regard to the resolution of Zeno’s paradoxes).
Two of the most ubiquitous quantities in classical kinematics are velocity and acceleration,
the latter being the derivative of the former and the second derivative of the position as a
function of time. Suppose a classical object has position x1 at time t1 and position x2 at
time t2 and that this is the only information we possess in relation to this object. The most
we can conclude from this is that the object had an average velocity,
v¯avg =
∆x¯
∆t
=
x2 − x1
t2 − t1
xˆ.
We have no idea what happened to the object in the interim; its velocity could have var-
ied considerably or not at all. The arguments of infinitesimal calculus, viz. Cauchy and
Weierstrass, are used to turn an average quantity such as this into an instantaneous one by
invoking limits, e.g.
v¯ = lim
∆t→0
x(t +∆t)− x(t)
∆t
=
dx¯
dt
.
Mathematically, there is nothing wrong with this. But let us now consider this from the
standpoint of empirical, i.e. physical, measurements.
IV. A SPEED TRAP2: THE DISCRETENESS OF EPISTEMIC STATES
First let us suppose our object is rigid which, by the usual rules of classical kinematics,
allows us to treat it as a point particle localized at its center-of-mass (let’s ignore any
contact interactions). Now suppose we wish to measure its speed with increasing accuracy.
While mathematics claims it is possible for us to measure it instantaneously, how might
we accomplish this empirically? One of the most accurate ways to measure the speed of
classical objects is with a radar (or speed) gun. The way a radar gun works is that it bounces
microwave signals off of a moving object and measures the Doppler shift of the signals. As
the object moves, the wavelength of the microwave signal changes and a phase shift arises
between the wavelength measured at an instant, t1, and a later instant, t2.
3 The assumption
2The author takes no responsibility for speeding tickets incurred by readers.
3This is technically true for both pulsed-Doppler and continuous-wave radar methods.
5is made that the electromagnetic wave is classical and thus continuous.4 But is classical light
real? Couldn’t classical light really be just a convenient approximation that relies on the the
assumption that the photons in the beam are too numerous to effectively count? Classical
light supposedly is free of quantum behavior, but couldn’t it be that the quantum behavior
is ‘washed out’ by the ‘noise’ of additional photons, analogous to picking out a particular
person from a crowd (the larger the crowd, the less likely it is that you’ll find that person
without some additional information)? This latter proposal is similar to coarse-graining
arguments in thermodynamic and quantum systems which have been used by Brukner and
Zeilinger to argue that the continuum is nothing but a mathematical construct, a view I
wholeheartedly endorse [10]. But even if we buy the classical light concept for now, what
happens if we wish to pinpoint the location of our object’s center-of-mass (unrealistically)
to an exact point?
We have two things to consider then: a) all light is really quantum, i.e. classical light is
merely an approximation or b) classical light is real and truly distinct from quantum me-
chanical light. In the first instance, it is clear why our attempt to find a truly instantaneous
velocity will fail: since the wavelength of quantized light is proportional to its energy, in
the limit as ∆t→ 0 the time-energy uncertainty relation prevents us from determining the
change in energy and thus the phase shift which, by extension, prevents us from measuring
the velocity of the object. Quantum systems have a limit to the accuracy with which they
can be measured. But this is well-known and only tends to force a retreat to the classical
interpretation of light.
So what happens in the limit as ∆t → 0 for classical light? One could argue that an
instantaneous velocity, by definition, occurs at a specific location in space and yet is defined
in terms of a change in location, which makes no sense. However, those who believe in
the reality of instantaneous states will simply cite the infinitesimal calculus as ‘proof’ of
the instantaneous state. While this smacks a bit of circularity, there is another argument
against instantaneous velocity that can be made on more physical grounds.
Suppose we decrease ∆t while leaving ∆x unchanged. As ∆t gets smaller and smaller,
it implies we are measuring the difference between x1 and x2 more and more rapidly. Lest
we forget, classical physics limits how rapidly information can propagate. At some point,
without changing ∆x, we will be empirically prevented from further reducing ∆t since the
ratio of ∆x to ∆t cannot exceed the speed of light. So, if we wish to take ∆t→ 0, we must
take ∆x → 0 in order to keep the ratio at or below the speed of light. But now we are
faced with a bit of a problem. The classical theory of light assumes light is a wave which is
an inherently non-local phenomenon. In order to describe something as a wave, it is either
necessary for it to have some spatial extent or for its overall function to be known so that
local curvature can be deduced. Clearly if we are forced to give it some spatial extent,
then ∆x has a non-zero lower bound and the speed of light then forces ∆t to also have a
non-zero lower bound which would seemingly prevent the measurement of an instantaneous
velocity. In other words, while the mathematical limit of ∆x/∆t as t → 0 is dx/dt, this is
not necessarily true empirically.
But, do we know the function? Perhaps there is a way to measure a localized aspect of
the wave. Since it is an electromagnetic wave we know it is some sort of sine function so, in
theory, we can calculate the so-called ‘local wavelength’ (essentially a measure of a wave’s
4Typically, ‘classical light’ is that described by Maxwell’s equations.
6localized curvature) by first finding its square [11],
[λ(x)]2 = −
4pi2f(x)
f ′′(x)
where f(x) ∝ sin(2pix/λ). Recall, however, that we are using the Doppler effect in order to
find the speed of our object. The speed of the object produces a change in wavelength (which
leads to a phase shift at the detector) in the incident wave that is directly proportional to
the object’s speed. This means that f(x) is dependent on the speed of the object and is thus
not known ahead of time. Therefore we can’t calculate the local curvature without already
knowing the object’s speed! We’re caught in a ‘Catch-22.’ Our only recourse is to conclude
that it is impossible to measure a truly instantaneous velocity.
So regardless of whether we consider the light from our radar gun as being classical or
quantum, there is a limit to how accurately it can measure velocity. Now, any attempt to
measure velocity (or just about any other physical quantity, for that matter) requires an
interaction between the observer and the system under observation (sorry folks, there’s just
no way around that). Any interaction necessarily requires an exchange of information. In
nearly every single classical physics experiment known to exist, electromagnetism - and thus
light - plays a role, either directly or indirectly, in the process of making a measurement on
the system. Thus it seems that while it is clearly mathematically possible for an instanta-
neous velocity to exist, we are physically prevented from ever measuring one! In this sense,
it appears that states of complete knowledge, in which the values of system variables are
known at every instant and in every point in space, are unobtainable. This would seem
to imply that epistemic states are ultimately discrete on some level: our knowledge of the
universe is discontinuous.
V. YET ANOTHER ANCIENT GREEK
What is it that makes us cling to continuity? The answer to that lies in the “dim
and distant past, as it were”5. As Trudeau points out, at the dawn of the 19th century,
Euclid’s Elements were regarded as the “supreme example of airtight deductive presentation”
[12]. This apparently airtight system ‘sprung a leak’ in the 19th century that led to the
rich development of non-Euclidean geometries. Nevertheless, Trudeau says, “Euclid’s text
. . . has been the scientific paradigm for most of scientific history” [12]. It was long thought
that Euclid’s axiomatic constructions required the continuity of space. One of the first to
challenge this assumption was mathematician Richard Dedekind in 1893 [13]. Dedekind and
others it is possible to construct discontinuous spaces in which Euclidean geometry holds
[14]. Regardless, the association between Euclidean geometry and continuity was deeply
ingrained in the scientific psyche for two millennia. Given that geometric theorems were
treated as objective truths that were knowable through intuition and/or reason and axioms
were treated as obvious implications of definitions (see, for example, [15]), it is then not a
stretch to think that the prevailing view held that the universe itself was continuous. In fact
it is doubtful, despite de Broglie’s contention, that anyone prior to the twentieth century
truly believed in a discontinuous universe, though they may have pondered the possibility.
5“. . . in fact so long ago it was damn nearly . . . in the year one.” Or once so said Ian Anderson of the band
Jethro Tull when introducing a live performance of the song ‘Skating Away on the Thin Ice of the New Day.’
7Indeed, one could argue that this stubborn persistence of belief in (or perhaps even natural
human ‘need’ for) continuity is what led to (at least partially) the development of hidden
variable theories.6
Of course, while results from the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) have
demonstrated that the geometry of the universe must be flat to better than 1% [16] and thus
‘Euclidean,’ we of course have long known that it is locally curved. In general relativity,
spacetime is normally modeled as a four-dimensional Lorentzian manifold (see, for example,
[17]) on which one can measure a Lorentzian distance. There is a direct relationship be-
tween causality on a given spacetime and the continuity of the Lorentzian distance on that
spacetime [18, 19]. This idea simply formalizes the somewhat intuitive notion that causality
is somehow related to continuity. To get a better conceptual understanding of this, suppose
two events, A and B, are causally connected. Then there must be some way to get informa-
tion from one to the other without exceeding the speed of light (or, more formally, they must
be either timelike or lightlike separated). If spacetime is discontinuous, how do we know
that this information couldn’t ‘jump around’ from point to point? Continuity guarantees
that the information follows a nice, orderly ‘path’ between A and B. This should make it
easy to see the conceptual attraction of a continuous reality. The problem is, how do we
empirically prove any of this?
Quantum field theory combines quantum mechanics with special relativity and so tech-
nically deals with a flat (Euclidean) spacetime. Attempted extensions of quantum field
theory to other manifolds have usually retained the causality-continuity connection. What
quantum field theory actually does is quantize the field. This has the attraction of solving
the problem of identical particles (i.e. technically any two electrons in the universe are
indistinguishable to some extent) since any two particles are simply different ‘dimples’ in
the same field, so-to-speak. By quantizing fields we have seemingly turned something in-
herently continuous and non-localized into something discrete and localized while somehow
maintaining certain causal and continuous aspects of the non-quantized field. To be clear,
quantum electrodynamics, which is a quantum field theory, is the most accurate scientific
theory ever developed, agreeing with experiment to within ten parts in a billion (10−8) [20].
But, ultimately, quantum field theory is built on quantum mechanics just as classical field
theory is naturally consistent with classical mechanics. Thus, if there is a problem in either
classical or quantum mechanics, as it appears there is from our gedankenexperiment with
the radar gun, this problem extends to the associated field theories.
We seem to be stuck. Any continuity to the universe is implied and not measured since
our ability to gain knowledge about the universe is necessarily discrete. Our only other
recourse, then, is to assume that mathematical ‘objects’ have some kind of ontological status.
The problem with this view is that there is no way to prove the ontological status of a
mathematical object (one could always argue it is simply a representation of a physical
object and is thus of a wholly different nature). Nevertheless, this is an ongoing subject of
debate (see for instance [3, 21]).
6Note that my argument in this essay does not necessarily preclude hidden variable theories, though neither
does it imply them. It is decidedly agnostic on the issue.
8VI. FINIS
So, is the universe digital or analog? Since it appears that our ability to gain knowledge
about the universe is discrete, we will likely never know unless we can find a clever way
around the problem of determining the continuity of something through a discontinuous
lens. To my mind, quantum field theory is merely a way to ‘have our cake and eat it too.’
Certainly it has been wildly successful, but at heart it is still a quantum theory. So perhaps
the more enlightening question would be, are all ‘quantum’ theories necessarily discrete?
The mere mention of the word ‘quantum’ implies a ‘yes’ answer to this, though perhaps
the quantum field theorists would argue this point. At any rate, it is my personal opinion
that what makes quantum field theory so successful is its inherent ‘quantumness.’ Classical
physics, with its inherent continuity, is nothing more than a convenient myth. It’s a nice
approximation that works just fine when we don’t look too closely. To be sure, it gets a few
things right and it does seem to be the natural way to explain gravity. But this is simply
because we don’t need better results in these cases. Gravity is so weak, we usually don’t
need to look too closely at it. Perhaps the problems that arise when we do, result from the
fact that we’re not supposed to look at it that closely; it’s like trying to make out a van
Gogh by looking at a single brush stroke.
Either way, there is clearly a limit to how much we can know about the universe regardless
of whether it is classical or quantum (or both). The fact that this limit even exists implies
that our knowledge about the universe is necessarily discrete. Even if Spekkens succeeds in
developing an epistemic theory based on continuous variables, it would simply mean that
individual epistemic states could be continuous. The collection of all epistemic states is
necessarily more limited than the collection of all ontic states. It is simply impossible to
know everything there is to know about the universe (though it is not clear that this is
necessary in order to definitively answer the question). In addition, if Spekkens succeeds,
his proof will likely be mathematical rather than empirical. It is conceivable that a clever
empiricist will find a way around this, but my guess is that the results would still be subject
to interpretation.
VII. CODA
When I was about two-thirds of the way through this essay my father-in-law passed away
quite unexpectedly. I suppose it is somehow fitting that this essay deals with continuity.
Larry was like a second father to me and I have chosen to dedicate this essay to his memory.
As I said in my eulogy to him, I’ve never been very good at saying goodbye. Finality is
not my forte´. Yet I have reached a conclusion in this essay that contradicts my personal
feelings. That is how science is supposed to work.
The universe is a strange and wonderful place. I would be disappointed if we could know
everything there was to know about it. Though the universe itself has cleverly prevented
us from determining whether or not it is continuous, I’d like to believe that it is, at least in
some respect, since then Larry could live on, even if it is just in an intangible way. After
all, the mere act of imagining something, since it is a part of us, means that it must be a
part of the universe.
.רבח ′םולש
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